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Huseman 1
From Renaissance to Robert: Machiavelli’s Monstrous Cycle of Life, Death, and Rebirth

Abstract: In this paper, I explore the recursive nature of cultural commentary as it is
informed by evolution of the monster. As one culture rises to prominence, so does the monster
which comments upon it. I specifically examine the cultural monstrosity of the Machiavellian
archetype as it is portrayed across time, first placing Machiavelli's theory in its original context,
then branching out to the cultural context surrounding its appearance in both the literature of
Renaissance England and the stories of today. Once I set up the broader theoretical context, I
probe more deeply into two literary depictions of the Machiavel: Iago from Othello (1603) and
Negan from The Walking Dead (2003-2019). I first investigate each character within the
limitations of Machiavelli’s actual musings then within the contextual (mis)understanding of
Machiavelli’s statutes. I ask three questions: Is the Machiavel a monster? What is the Machiavel
trying to tell us? Why should we listen?

Chapter One: The Cycle of Chaos

The word entropy is synonymous with randomness, disorder, and chaos. The scientific
observers of the universe have come to the consensus that one of the core truths about the fabric
of existence is that entropy always increases. Stars decay, buildings crumble, cells deteriorate,
empires fall, all things tend towards chaos. The Third Law of Thermodynamics paints a picture
of the relationship between energy and chaos, and between chaos and motion. As energy
(temperature) decreases, so does chaos. In a perfectly crystalline structure completely devoid of
motion, chaos ceases to exist. It is directly correlated with motion. When you substitute “chaos”
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for “motion” and sprinkle a little literary magic on the laws of physics you come across an
interesting historical-sociological concept: all systems tend towards chaos and will remain in
chaos unless acted on by an outside force.
Chaos can be harnessed, just like we harnessed the power of the river in the Hoover Dam
to generate electricity or used the gravitational pull of the Moon to slingshot the Apollo 13 crew
back towards Earth. Just as scientists were able to lasso the inertia of the physical world, so too
are individuals capable of capturing and redirecting the inertial chaos of the socio-cultural world.
When our man-made structures fall apart and the primal cycle towards disorder resumes, those
who are aware of the tides of chaos and are willing to wade into them can harness their power to
do incredible things.
We see the cycle of chaos and order in the crumbling ruins of once-great empires and the
stories of their demise. While some amazing leaders may try to stand in the gap, they are only
delaying the inevitable: chaos will always advance in the end. These heroes—individuals like
Queen Elizabeth I, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Ghandi, Martin Luther King, Jr.—are destined to
fail. While the history books are full of the stories of great men and women who were brave
enough to stand in the gap against chaos, against tyranny and injustice, they also tell the story of
those who stepped into the chaos and embraced it.
For millennia, artists have encountered the anxieties inherent to chaos and have embodied
those anxieties in character. They have witnessed the cycle of chaos, the ebb and flow of
disorder, and have captured in story both the archetypal heroes and villains of the ages. From the
mythologies of ancient cultures to the modern film scripts, our adoration of those who shield us
from chaos and our fear of those who wield it is made manifest in the stories we tell. As the
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trendline of culture inevitably dips down towards chaos, the all-too-familiar cultural fears rise
once more. So too, from the ashes of the time of peace and comfort rises the Wielder of Chaos.

Chapter Two: The Wielder of Chaos

“In the midst of chaos, there is also opportunity.”
-Sun Tzu

As the door to that primordial fire stands open and the one who stood in the gap
inevitably falls, a shadow steps into the doorway, silhouetted by the flames behind it. Regardless
of the specific cultural moment, the silhouette remains the same. The specific mask it wears will
change, but the general outline will remain constant. In Renaissance England, the Wielder took
the form of Shakespeare’s Iago and Lady Macbeth, John Milton’s Satan in Paradise Lost, and
Marlowe’s Mephistopheles in Doctor Faustus. Today, we see the Wielder in Marlon Brando’s
Don Corleone, James Gandolfini’s Tony Soprano, Heath Ledger’s Joker, and Jeffrey Dean
Morgan’s Negan.
This archetype is defined most accurately by Machiavelli in The Prince. In this text, he
records his observations of the history of power: how it was gained, how it was maintained, and
how it was lost. The Prince, which was published years after his death, was not received well by
the Renaissance gentry. Machiavelli was quickly taken to be an agent of evil and accused of
inciting tyrannical actions in others. He is put on trial for the evil deeds done in the wake of his
teachings. However, Machiavelli cannot be held accountable for the sins of others. The
publication of The Prince did not introduce sin to the world, nor did it create some new level of
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depravity in man. The Prince cannot be held accountable for the evil actions of tyrannical
governments in the centuries following.
In no way does this excuse the cold, mechanical calculations of cruelty found in the
chapters of The Prince. Machiavelli still made the claim that it was necessary for Israel to be
enslaved and suffer so that Moses’ glory may shine (Machiavelli 170). If he were writing today,
he would claim that the death and suffering of millions at the hands of Hitler and his dreams of
the Third Reich were necessary so that the ability of Eisenhower or Churchill or Patton could be
shown. Excusing Machiavelli is detrimental to appreciating and studying his work. Harvey
Mansfield goes so far as to say that it “rob[s] [Machiavelli] of the glory he claimed for having
begun the scholarly practice of making such excuses” (296).
Machiavelli operates mechanically, like a computer crunching the numbers, a machine
incapable of empathy or remorse. He declares that the leader should respond not in accordance
with what should be done, with the imagined, utopian picture of what the world could be, but
rather within the context of what is done, to perceive and react to how the people in the world
truly operate. He has no time for Plato’s Republic, Thomas More’s Utopia, or St. Augustine’s
City of God. He deals only in reality and in the real world people die. Wars happen and
kingdoms are burned to the ground. The prince can either stand by and watch as the enemy
smashes through his kingdom, or he can accept what Machiavelli would see as the “burden of
leadership” and commit the necessary evils through which his kingdom is preserved.
Machiavelli is not creating anything new; he is simply sharing the truths of the world of
politics in cold, emotionless detail. Yet through this collection of his observations, he ends up
creating an entirely new movement of political realism. The world Machiavelli presents in The
Prince is not an invented world but a historical one, viewed through an entirely logical, rational
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brain. The future Machiavelli presents is almost utopian, yet I find that it is eerily reminiscent of
Ursula Le Guin’s fictional city, Omelas: a utopian city on the surface preserved by atrocities
hidden below ground.
Upon the publication of The Prince, the world was introduced to Machiavellian political
realism which stood in stark contrast to the traditional ethics of the day. At the time Machiavelli
is writing, the Catholic church and its belief system are inextricably woven into the European
cultural fabric. Christian ethics and politics are inseparable. Within this realm of thought, to be a
good leader, one must be a good person. Machiavelli, on the other hand, argues the exact
opposite: “princes who have done great things have held good faith of little account”
(Machiavelli 121), allowing for morals to rule in the private sphere but to be disregarded in the
political (Mansfield).
This was the most contentious point for much of the Christian-dominated Western world
in the decades and centuries following Machiavelli’s death. Sydney Anglo, professor of the
History of Ideas at Swansea University, agrees: “Many thinkers were trying to come to grips
both with the changing political scene... and with Machiavelli’s extreme statement of political
realism. Others were revolted both by that changing scene and its theoretical juxtaposition”
(Anglo 128). Although Anglo is speaking about the English reception here (and we must return
to this region), this “theoretical juxtaposition” is best explored in French politics.
The first major attack against Machiavelli’s theories comes from French lawyer Innocent
Gentillet by way of his manuscript Anti-Machiavel. Gentillet set about writing this piece
following the tragic Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre. In the introduction to one of the later
editions of the pamphlet, Gentillet writes: “Monseigneur, estant sur le poinct d’exposer en
lumière ces Discours contre Machiavel, pour descouvrir aux gens d’entendment de nostre nation
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Françoise la source et les autheurs de la tyrannie...” (qtd. in Rathé 187). The attack occurs on
Saint Bartholomew’s Day in 1572, forty-five years after Machiavelli’s death, yet here, he is
blamed for fifteen years’ worth of tyrannical actions perpetrated by the French Catholics against
the Huguenots. Gentillet’s Anti-Machiavel is “clearly marked by the Massacre of Saint
Bartholomew” (Rathé 187). Anglo claims that Machiavelli is involved in this seemingly
unrelated incident because “he was the one political theorist whose writings could be regarded as
condoning such extreme action” (Anglo 131).
Gentillet is not necessarily misguided in his understanding of Machiavelli’s teachings;
however, he does show a vehement hatred of Machiavelli’s propensity for cruelty. Gentillet is
partial toward the more traditional, classical bent of the political spectrum of the time while
“only Machiavelli... seems, of those in his times, to have declared himself for progress in terms
we recognize” (Mansfield 294). The root of the difference between these two political views is
humanism, which “puts man, rather than God, at the center of attention” (Mansfield 294). Rathé
suggests that this contrasting perspective on the role of religion in governance is the root of
Gentillet’s disagreement with Machiavellian politics: “Imbued with the classical view that
politics is but the extension of ethics and committed to Christian principles, Gentillet could never
accept the separation proposed by Machiavelli” (Rathé 195). This devotion to religion
juxtaposed with Machiavelli’s starkly contrasting amoralistic atheistic political theory is an
insurmountable obstacle in coming to terms with Machiavelli’s writings.
In France, he is blamed by many for the actions of tyrannical political powers. In
England, Machiavelli’s writings find the country in the midst of a bloody struggle for power
following the chaotic and tumultuous reign of Henry VIII. This is not the most comforting
context to hear Machiavelli’s ominous prophecy: “for men change their rulers willingly, hoping
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to better themselves, and this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein
they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have gone from bad to
worse” (Machiavelli 31). Even less comforting is the emotionless implication of the helplessness
of the commoner: “men ought to be either well-treated or crushed... the injury done to a man
ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge” (Machiavelli 35).
While it is less clear at first whether Machiavelli found sound footing in England or not
(there is speculation that negative French sentiment towards Machiavelli’s ideas soured the
English towards the politician’s theories), Wyndham Lewis, in his work The Lion and the Fox,
stated that “with or without Gentillet... the ideas of Machiavelli would have been abhorrent to
men of church and state in the sixteenth century” (qtd. Rathé 197). Echoing this sentiment, in
1552, “the Dominican priest Ambrogio Caterino Politi attacked Machiavelli as a heretic for
seeing religion only as a ‘persuasive instrument of human credulity’” (Kahn 66). Victoria Kahn
also quotes Cardinal Pole, who in 1539 declared “that Machiavelli’s words ‘stink of the malice
of Satan’” and “was written ‘by Satan’s hand’” (Kahn 87).
In the Christian world, Machiavelli is immediately tied to atheism, as if his teachings
were rooted in atheistic theory and could only be borne out in a man devoid of faith. However, as
time wears on in England, this idea is proven to be false as Machiavelli’s “reason of state” is
eventually assimilated by Christianity once “context and intention” are used to determine the
morality of an action (Kahn 90). In reality, Machiavelli’s teachings are not built on atheism;
rather, they function on four main premises, all centered around the concept of control: “a wise
prince should establish himself on that which is in his own control and not in that of others”
(Machiavelli 120). One, create for yourself your own power. Two, control who is in power
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around you. Three, garner the admiration and fear of the people. Four, view everything as a
resource.
Machiavelli, whether through observation or presupposition, held those who made much
from little in high esteem, especially in comparison to those who found success by way of
Fortune. Those who come into power by their own virtue are far more likely to maintain their
position than those to whom power was simply given. This is made even more apparent in
studying the advice Machiavelli gives to those who come into power through luck or inheritance:
“Make for yourself your own name, separate yourself from others.” The self-made man (a
significant Western icon) is most able on the frontier, in the lawless land where he is able to take
advantage of opportunity and seize for himself the power that is available to him. In his book,
Outliers, Malcolm Gladwell highlights the Western focus on the “American Dream” (with the
intention of exposing the conception as false): “If you work hard enough and assert yourself, and
use your mind and imagination, you can shape the world to your desires” (Gladwell 151).
The Wielder of Chaos, the Machiavel, takes this American Dream to the extreme,
achieving success by any means necessary. He operates out of this narcissistic belief in his own
ability, ascribing to the belief that “might is right.” Because he is able to shape the world, he is
right to do so.

Interlude: Introducing the Monster

“We make our own monsters, then fear them for what they show us about ourselves.”
-Mike Carey
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The Machiavel is most likely to succeed in times of unrest, in the middle of a power
vacuum, in the realm of chaos. The artist writes the anxieties of the moment into the work of art.
Therefore, as chaos ebbs and flows, so too does the presence of the Machiavel. He exists for a
fleeting moment to prey on the fears of the people, then slinks back into the shadows when order
is restored. This cycle of life, death, and rebirth so intricately tied to the anxieties of culture is
essential to the monster.
Whether in literature, oral tradition, news headlines, or rows of Halloween costumes in
October—monsters exist for more than mere entertainment. They are more than a simple excuse
for an adrenaline rush at the amusement park: there is purpose behind the fear. Fear (and, by
extension, the thing we fear) defines us. It influences each step we take. When we hear wolves
howl in a foggy forest, generally our first instinct isn’t going to be to run full-bore towards the
hungry predator. When we catch a glimpse of a shifting shadow at the end of an alley, it is not
exactly common practice to saunter over and offer the poltergeist your business card.
Freudian psychoanalysis picks up on this thread of fear. There is a constant war being
fought on the verge of the conscious mind to hold the repressed in the shadows of the
unconscious. According to Freud, these repressed memories and experiences inform an
individual’s actions, and an individual’s dreams serve as a window to the unconscious. In
studying an individual’s dreams, Freud is able to gain an understanding of the thing that is
repressed—the thing his patient fears—thereby accessing intimate insight into the motivation
behind an individual’s actions.
Abstracting Freud’s development of the interplay between the conscious and
unconscious realms of the individual psyche to the communal or societal level, the monster (or
the defining characteristics of the monstrous) is borne from the communal unconscious. The
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monster is akin to Freud’s concept of the repressed, waging war on the border of the
unconscious, seeking out any path to the conscious. The unconscious is the realm of the
monsters, a place that is “timeless” and pays “little regard to reality” (Freud 582), while the
conscious is the realm of reality, of borders and definitions, certainty and order. Just as dreams
provide the conscious mind insight into the goings-on of the unconscious, giving veiled glimpses
of the repressed monster waging war on the psyche, so do stories function in culture. By studying
the monster in literature, we are able to extrapolate truths about the fears of the culture which
brought about the creation of the monster just as Freud, by studying the characteristics of
dreams, was able to extrapolate truths about the nature of the unconscious and the Things which
lurk there.

Chapter Three: Iago

Machiavelli revealed in society the rot beneath the surface. He tore away the shimmering
veneer of the royal class and revealed the disgusting wreck beneath the strong kingdoms, the
powerful rulers, the holy men of the ages. Iago undergoes a similar washing process in Othello.
From the very outset, he is a character which makes the audience’s skin crawl while
simultaneously indulging their deepest fantasies of insidious power and ultimate control. Yet, to
the other members of the cast, he is “honest Iago,” a man to be trusted, a loyal confidant. He
embodies the rotting morality of the politician which Machiavelli’s writings brought to
prominence in The Prince.
No matter how it is experienced, whether it is viewed in The Globe, at a local university,
or read in an alcove of the public library, Othello is a remarkably painful experience. In the
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pages below, I will argue this is centrally due to the play’s main villain, Iago, and his monstrous,
Machiavellian tendencies.

i.

Iago’s Musings
“Before Abraham was, I am.”
-The words of Jesus, John 8:58

When we first encounter Iago, he is walking down a street in Venice at night alongside
his friend, Roderigo. From the outset, we are privy to Iago’s inner musings. He has revealed to
Roderigo his hatred for Othello (“Thou toldst me thou didst hold him in thy hate”) and his own
strange, duplicitous nature (“Were I the Moor I would not be Iago”). This is a rather obtuse
statement on the surface: of course, if Iago were anything other than Iago then he would no
longer be Iago. It is such a plain statement it is almost silly to say it. Yet, in this statement, he is
laying the foundation for his deceit: he is placing himself in contrast to the militaristic honor of
Othello. Othello’s honor is anchored in his honesty—honesty to the point of crudeness. Othello
is not an eloquent orator (“Rude am I in my speech”). He neither paints wondrous pictures nor
embellishes stories with hyperbolic descriptions. He tells the Venetian officers, “I will a round
unvarnished tale deliver,” one without a slant or an angle (Othello, I.iii.106), one that is
comprised of the simple facts of the matter.
Iago stands in stark contrast to the honorable Othello. In declaring “Were I the Moor I
would not be Iago” he reveals his two-faced nature: he will seem as if he follows Othello out of
love or duty, “but seeming so for my peculiar end” (Othello, I.iii.66), that is, “to serve my turn
upon him” (Othello, I.iii.45). Iago is the black stain of sin on an honest (albeit, naïve) cast. No
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statement more explicitly defines Iago’s duplicity than his final, heretical statement before he
sets his plans in motion: “I am not what I am” (Othello, I.iii.71).
Iago’s villainy is unique in that he draws the audience so close to the play through his
constant barrage of monologues and asides. The most famous of these soliloquies comes in Act
2, Scene 3:
And what’s he then that says I play the villain,
When this advice is free I give and honest,
Probal to thinking, and indeed the course
To win the Moor again? For ‘tis most easy
Th’inclining Desdemona to subdue
In any honest suit. She’s framed as fruitful
As the free elements. And then for her
To win the Moor—(were’t) to renounce his baptism,
All seals and symbols of redeemed sin—
His soul is so enfettered to her love
That she may make, unmake, do what she list,
Even as her appetite shall play the god
With his weak function. How am I then a villain
To counsel Cassio to this parallel course
Directly to his good? Divinity of hell!
When devils will the blackest sins put on,
they do so at first with heavenly shows,
As I do now. For whiles this honest fool
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Plies Desdemona to repair his fortune,
And she for him pleads strongly to the Moor,
I’ll pour this pestilence into his ear:
That she repeals him for her body’s lust;
And by how much she strives to do him good,
She shall undo her credit with the Moor.
So I will turn her virtue to pitch,
And out of her own goodness make the net
That shell enmesh them all (II.iii.238-264).
This speech can be split into two sections, divided at Iago’s paradoxical exclamation
“Divinity of hell!” (Othello, II.iii.370). In the first half, it’s almost as if Iago is trying to justify
his morality, as if he is trying to come to grips with his decisions. He begins on the surface,
where the rest of the cast resides, and on the surface, his rhetorical point rings true: the person
who says Iago is a villain is wrong. Without the motivational context, he truly appears to be
pointing Cassio towards the course “To win the Moor again” (Othello, II.iii.359). Iago is again
telling the truth when he notes Desdemona’s honesty in pursuing Cassio’s reinstatement, and
Iago is correct once more in identifying Desdemona’s power over Othello.
But, Iago is speaking from the vantage point of Emilia, of Cassio or Desdemona. They do
not know that it was Iago who orchestrated Cassio’s downfall in the first place (“Now, ‘mongst
this flock of drunkards / Am I [to put] our Cassio in some action / to offend the isle” (Othello,
II.ii.61-64), so therefore, his “free and honest” advice which he gives to Cassio is neither free nor
honest. Nor do the other characters know Iago’s intentions to lie to Othello, to play upon
Othello’s insecurities to conjure jealousy from innocence. Iago—like Machiavelli—creates
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nothing new. The jealousy which eventually drives Othello into a murderous rage was already
present within him. Othello’s capacity to commit murder was already within him. Cassio’s
drunkenness was already within him. Iago simply found the quickest route to chaos and grasped
it, using the faults of those around him to whip the cast of the play into a frenzy.
Ironically, Iago repeats the question, “How am I then a villain?” and then succumbs to
the evil. This second section is seeping with insidious, devilish sentiment. It is devoid of
emotional complexity, honesty, and color. These final twelve lines are dripping with hatred and
bloodlust. Here, Iago dives into the depths; he slips down to where the corrupt, twisted truth lies.
He assumes the audience’s perspective and revels in it. He highlights the devilish nature of his
actions, draws a relationship between honesty and foolishness, and perverts the good in those
around him.
Twice, he references “black” imagery. Blackness is a key theme throughout the play,
both in terms of race and morality. It is equated with the evil, carnal, bestial. We don’t make it
even 100 lines into the play before encountering the first example of this racial equation:
Roderigo:

What a [full] fortune does the [thick-lips] owe
If he can carry it thus.

Iago counters just a few lines later with his own image, contrasting joy and color:
Iago:

Though that his joy be joy,
Yet throw such chances of vexation on’t
As it may lose some color.

Even as Iago calls out to Brabantio’s window, he exaggerates the details of the love affair
between Desdemona and Othello, bringing not only color into the mix, but also tying that color
to bestiality. Othello is an “old black ram” that is “tupping” Desdemona, a “white ewe” (Othello,
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I.i.97-98). Here we have the contrast between the savagery of blackness and the innocence of
whiteness. This is especially evident in the nature of the animalism. The ram is a violent,
barbaric creature. One that slams its head into things. It is not exactly known as a gentle animal.
The lamb is so innocent and pure it is associated with the Messiah, the “sacrificial lamb.”
Throughout this section, Iago continues piling on this evil, bestial imagery. He calls
Othello a devil and a horse (Othello, I.i.100, 125). In doing so, he poisons Brabantio’s mind
towards Othello. We know from Othello’s speech later to the Venetian officers that he was once
beloved by Brabantio: “Her father loved me, oft invited me, / Still questioned me the story of my
life” (I.iii.128-129). Yet, with just a nudge here and a prod there at Brabantio’s most vulnerable
points, Iago is able to turn his mind against a man he once held in high regard.
Meredith Anne Skura argues that, prior to the nineteenth century, Othello’s blackness
was inconsequential. She says, “The Moor was a tragic hero whose color was irrelevant and
whose greatness and savagery could be considered together without contradiction” (Skura 299).
But since the extreme racialization of the British Empire (and, subsequently, the United States as
well), Othello has been unable to escape the “context of discourse about color prejudice” (Skura
299). Blackness during this Enlightenment period was “emotionally blank on three levels:
physically, culturally, and spiritually” (Makonnen 348). Thomas Jefferson noted in Notes on the
State of Virginia that black skin hid the red flush of anger or embarrassment that you are able to
see in white individuals (Makonnen 349). Iago’s bestial, savage imagery perfectly encapsulates
the cultural blankness attributed to blackness. Makonnen references the words of Adam Smith
who argues that the physical “smothering” of emotions necessarily leads the “savages” and
“barbarians” to “acquire the habits of falsehood and dissimulation” (Makonnen 349). Finally,
this blankness of emotional expression leads the Enlightenment thinkers to actually believe that
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blackness is equated with muted emotions. Writers like Immanuel Kant, Thomas Jefferson, and
Georg Hegel all held the view that “the blankness of black skin suggest[ed] an emotional match”
(Makonnen 349).
These themes of black and white, bad and good, emotionless and emotional, cursed and
blessed, tainted and pure stain the play. With this more full understanding of the colored
language, I want to take another look at the final twelve lines of Iago’s speech in Act 2:
When devils will the blackest sins put on,
they do so at first with heavenly shows,
As I do now. For whiles this honest fool
Plies Desdemona to repair his fortune,
And she for him pleads strongly to the Moor,
I’ll pour this pestilence into his ear:
That she repeals him for her body’s lust;
And by how much she strives to do him good,
She shall undo her credit with the Moor.
So I will turn her virtue to pitch,
And out of her own goodness make the net
That shell enmesh them all (II.iii.253-264).
Iago’s “blackest sins” infect the good in the play. He taints Desdemona’s goodness, her
lamb-like purity, and by doing so, poisons the sacrifice and removes all hope for redemption in
the play, consigning each of the characters to damnation. Iago is a rotting disease who—through
his cunning and ambition—is able to create for himself his own chaos by weaving together and
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preying upon the faults of those around him. He reveals in each character on the stage, each
member in the audience, and each reader at home the monstrous inhumanity present in all.

ii.

Iago’s Monstrosity

If the monster exists to make known the monstrous in the individual and the collective, to
highlight human difference and tear down that which defines, to signify the Other and expose the
absurdity of the signifier, to instill fear and cultivate desire, what questions about human nature
does Iago raise? How does he alter our perception of the world? What lines does he cross? What
sins does he bear? First, he must be understood in his archetypal origins as Machiavel-incarnate.
Second, he must be understood in the specific cultural context in which he was written. Third, he
must be understood in our modern context today.
The repressed is bound to surface, the monster inevitably returns, “no monster tastes of
death but once. The anxiety that condenses like green vapor into the form of a vampire can be
dispersed temporarily, but the revenant by definition returns” (J. Cohen 5). Just as Auden
describes the numerous incarnations of Iago (“a Roderigo Iago, a Cassio Iago, an Othello Iago, a
Desdemona Iago...” (Auden 258)), the monster exists simultaneously as one and many. The
Machiavel is one archetype with many incarnations. An essential step, then, in understanding
Iago’s lesson, is found in understanding the archetype from which he was born.
The Machiavellian monster is defined by the borders it crosses and definitions it upends.
Perhaps the most ideologically revolting Machiavellian conception is his rejection of traditional
religious and moral values. His amoralistic view of politics stood in direct contrast to the rising
humanist movement of the day. Where the humanists said universal good was to be found in
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man, Machiavelli said man was fickle and evil. Where the church said a good man would make a
good king, Machiavelli said a good king must also know how to be not good. He allowed room
for necessary evils, and so was blamed for the evil acts committed by others. Innocent Gentillet
specifically accuses Machiavelli for influencing “les autheurs de la tyrannie...” (Rathé 187) in
France. “The Author of Tyranny” exposes another deep cultural wound which comes to
characterize the Machiavellian monster in literature.
Machiavelli’s writings at the time seemed to condone the tyrannical actions oppressing
many communities across Europe, and thus the Machiavel embodies this tyrannical villainy in
literature. Iago runs rampant, his power unchecked, willing his evil designs to completion
without restraint. Barabas, in The Jew of Malta, follows the same path, as does the Cardinal in
Webster’s Duchess of Malfi. These characters seem to exercise their will with impunity, until—
of course—their luck eventually runs out.
The portrayal of the Machiavel as a tyrannical atheist reveals two major fears of the
culture at-large. First, the people are fearful of oppression and political upheaval, especially in
England. Following Henry VIII’s tumultuous reign and the procession of bloody executions and
fruitless campaigns for the throne, the people of England finally found stability in Queen
Elizabeth... for a time. As her reign comes to a close, the fear of another violent interregnum
looms large in the collective psyche as she, like Henry VIII, does not have a direct heir to the
throne. Second, in a world rife with theological warfare, Machiavelli’s call to lay down the
burden of religion strikes at the core of European life. Much of the blood spilt in the struggle for
power in England was in the name of religious fervor. The English had experienced much pain
and strife at the hands of religious disagreement. The Machiavel then seems to be a scapegoat for
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both sides to justify themselves. Both Protestant and Catholic can look at the dirty, atheistic
Machiavel and say, “Well, at least I’m not him.”
Iago certainly fits the tyrannical atheist mold of the Machiavellian archetype. His
comparison of “Virtue!” to “a fig!” when read in light of the rest of his actions across the course
of the play’s action seems to mold himself rather closely in line with the amoralism of
Machiavelli. A.C. Bradley’s description of Iago as puppet master (Bradley 229), when read in
context of Iago’s designs to “turn [Desdemona’s] virtue to pitch / And out of her own goodness
make the net / That shall enmesh them all” (2.3.331-333), paints Iago in a rather tyrannical light,
especially considering his uncanny success in these efforts.
However, Iago is not just a herald to the past: he still speaks truth today. He still plays on
fears in our modern context, even though modern mores are vastly different from those of Tudor
England. While there is a growing political divide in America as individuals slowly drift towards
the extremes, it would be difficult to soundly argue we have experienced political upheaval even
remotely close to that of England after the death of Henry VIII. The argument of a tyrannical
presence might be plausible but in a vastly different context than those living under a monarchy
might experience. Since the monster always escapes to return again, there are certain human
messages it must relay, lessons that may be taught regardless of cultural context. These
intimately human flaws are peculiar and enticing. Despite our fear of the monster, we experience
a certain seduction, a piqued interest in its curious construction.
We are drawn to its freedom from borders, its lack of restraint. J. Cohen writes, “the
linking of monstrosity with the forbidden makes the monster all the more appealing as a
temporary egress from constraint” (J. Cohen 17). So long as the monster remains trapped in its
box—whether that be drama, story, or film—we allow ourselves to indulge in a twisted sort of
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escapist fantasy. The carnival, the circus, Halloween all allow for a safe place to play the demon.
We fill the vacuum with our exotic, erotic, monstrous fantasies. The distant lands where the wild
things are “are more than dark regions of uncertain danger: they are also realms of happy
fantasy, horizons of liberation” (J. Cohen 18). “We watch the monstrous spectacle of the horror
film because we know that the cinema is a temporary place, that the jolting sensuousness of the
celluloid images will be followed by reentry into the world of comfort and light” (J. Cohen 17).
We are allowed to feel this sense of guilty pleasure, this twisted desire to be like the monster,
because we know that we will return to reality in just a few moments. We understand that as we
reach Act V of Othello, we are nearing the end of our attraction to Iago’s intellectual power, so
we allow ourselves to indulge.
R.A. Foakes says of Othello: “The key to the play is not the extent to which Othello is
infected by Iago, but the extent to which we the audience are seduced by him” (qtd. Bloom 18).
The choice to describe Iago’s interaction with the audience as “seduction” brings in a level of
intimacy to our attraction to Iago. There is something paradoxical about this allure as it generally
results in one of two responses: either guilty indulgence or violent negation. Yet, as Freud
argues, “Negation is a way of taking cognizance of what is repressed” (Freud 667). Our violent
denial, “I am nothing like Iago,” suggests there is some connection that inspired fear of
discovering further similarities and thus coming face to face with the monster in the mirror.
Foakes develops this concept of intimacy further: “For it is impossible to reject altogether the
satirist’s vision, even while we recognize and are horrified by the malice of... Iago, since his
truths come too near to home” (qtd. Bloom 18).
Samuel Johnson and W.H. Auden describe this intimate connection as respect or
admiration of Iago. Johnson describes Iago’s skill as “artful” (Johnson 247); Auden, “our
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aesthetic respect is reserved for Iago” (Auden 247). Auden goes further, however, describing in
greater detail these “truths” that “come too near to home” (qtd. Bloom 18). He implies that men
and women like Iago are much more prevalent in the modern world: “none of us can honestly
say that he does not understand how such a wicked person can exist” (Auden 268) because in our
modern, scientific pursuit of knowledge, “we have all accepted the notion that the right to know
is absolute and unlimited” (Auden 269). Iago is allowed to experiment on Othello’s mind and
examine what is inside because (although we actively know this to be untrue, we cannot
collectively deny the belief that) an untamed pursuit of intelligence is different from an
unchecked desire for food or sex. Auden continues, “it is difficult for us... to apply a categorical
imperative to knowing, so that, instead of asking, ‘What can I know?’ we ask, ‘What, at this
moment, am I meant to know?’ (Auden 271-272). We refuse to limit the pursuit of knowledge,
“to entertain the possibility that the only knowledge which can be true for us is the knowledge
we can live up to—that seems to all of us crazy and almost immoral. But, in that case, who are
we to say to Iago, ‘No, you mustn’t’” (Auden 272)?
We admire Iago’s relentless pursuit of knowledge, yet, even as we are seduced by him,
we are convicted. As Iago enables our fantasy through his asides and soliloquies, we connect
more and more with him. As this connection grows deeper, we cannot help but see a bit of
ourselves in him, and consequently, a piece of Iago in us. This reaches beyond the bounds of the
stage; it is outside the rules of the play. When we leave the theatre, the characters are supposed to
stay behind. It is our understanding that the actors remove their wigs and makeup. That when the
curtain closes, the monster is gone.
Yet, if Iago, like a Horcrux, implants a piece of himself in each of us, we carry him with
us everywhere that we go. Iago shows us that the Machiavel ignores the boundaries of play; he
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laughs at the “fourth wall.” When the Machiavel reaches the edge of the theatre stage, it steps
down into the audience, and doing so, brings its terror into our reality. The fears which were
once safely enclosed in the lines of the quarto and the boundaries of the stage are brought
intimately, dangerously close. And so we must destroy him, “shew Divine Vengeance upon him”
(Rymer), thinking that perhaps by annihilating him, we may be cleansed.

Chapter Four: Negan

“The road to power is paved with hypocrisy and casualties. Never regret.”
-Frank Underwood (House of Cards)

We allow ourselves the adrenaline rush of engaging with movies like Pan’s Labyrinth or
The Conjuring, books like The Castle of Otranto or The Monk, because we know that we can
grab the remote and turn off the television, we can stand up and walk out of the movie theatre,
we can close the book, douse it in holy water, then throw it in the fire. We are not ever actually
in danger. Horace Walpole, the author of The Castle of Otranto, wrote in his preface to the
second edition of the novel, “The ‘pain and terror’ [of the horrors] have to be ‘modified’ enough
so ‘as to not be actually noxious,’ and the terror should never reach the point of being
‘conversant about the present destruction of the person’ who is the observer” (qtd. Hogle 163). In
other words, traditional horror is dumbed down enough so as to not cross over into our conscious
experience. There is a certain distance there. It is like walking about the concourse of the zoo and
looking down on the den of lions while they feed.
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Hogle adds, “we allow ourselves the ‘rush’ of endorphins activated by fear while we
simultaneously know ourselves to be safe from the actual effects” (163). We have a certain
degree of control over the situation. We understand that when the demon lurches at the camera,
we still hold the remote.
However, as Iago has shown, the Machiavel breaks these boundaries. Our souls are
entangled in its monstrosity, bridging it to our reality. When it lunges at the television screen, it
keeps travelling into the living room. When it stalks about the panels of the comic, it bleeds off
the edge of the page into the real world. The Machiavel ignores the boundaries of fiction, invades
reality, and like a parasite, latches itself to the audience, violating all of the laws of the limitation
of story.

i.

Negan’s Playground

The zombie is unique in that it doesn’t have a significant historical literary foundation.
Unlike the vampire (who will always pay homage to Bram Stoker), the zombie is exclusive in
the cast of Gothic monsters as it seemingly skipped literary tradition, jumping straight from
folklore to the screen. The zombi—as it is referred to in Haitian folklore—is a monster created
by voodoo magic (Bishop 5). The voodoo version still deals with a lack of consciousness, but it
is not quite the shambling corpse which we are familiar with today. The “walking dead” version
does not quite take shape until George Romero’s films hit the silver screen in the late 1900s.
Then, at the turn of the century, the zombie apocalypse genre exploded.
Kyle William Bishop, in American Zombie Gothic, poses that the fear following the
terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 generated a sense that “people are not as safe and secure
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as they might have once thought” (Bishop 9). The sense of unease and fear surrounding the
American psyche led to the rise of the zombie in pop culture. At its heart, the zombie apocalypse
embodies a world that feels imminently dangerous, where death could strike at any moment.
Born out of this cultural moment, Bishop says that the zombie apocalypse explores “the collapse
of societal infrastructures, the resurgence of survivalist fantasies, and the fear of other surviving
humans” (Bishop 19). Steve Shaviro says, “In contrast to the inhumanity of vampire-capital,
zombies present the ‘human face’ of capitalist monstrosity” (qtd. in Canavan 432). David Punter
affirms this zombie-capitalism allegory while also providing a number of other potential
symbolic statements: “the ultimate consumer... inexplicable capitalist practices... the ‘perfect
stranger’... the acme of libertarianism... the key to survival... or perhaps the zombie is the sign of
‘philosophical apocalypse’” (Punter 306). Perhaps the zombie “is the unthinking human reborn, a
body without a mind, stalking and devouring brains on the planet it hopes to rule in a cosmos it
fears and does not understand nor care to understand” (Punter 307).
The zombie is, of course, not confined to any one of these statements and, in any given
story, could embody each one of these allegorical statements in some manner or another.
Regardless of the specific phraseology, the general message of the zombie is that there is no
larger plan at work, that death is random, that there is no real, substantial difference between
individuals. That deep down, below the dream of individuation, is the truth that none of us is
really that different. Punter makes the argument that traditionally the Gothic is about history. But
it has come to be about the future, about who we may eventually become. The zombie tells a new
story, that we all grow up twisted, bent out of shape (Punter 308).
The zombie—like a true monster—lies at a crossroads, inhabits that liminal space
between two genres, blurring the borders of horror and science fiction. Robert Kirkman, author
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of The Walking Dead inadvertently speaks to this fusion of genres in the introduction to the
series: “Good zombie movies show us how messed up we are, they make us question our station
in society.... and our society’s station in the world” (Kirkman). Rather than the Wellsian
“invasion from the future,” the zombie invades the present from the past: “erupting from the
graves of our decomposing loved ones to establish their apocalyptic ecology of universal death”
(Canavan 440-441).
One of the most impressive moments from early in the comics comes in Issue #24 when
Rick Grimes delivers a harrowing speech from within the walls of the prison they call home. He
has just admitted to executing one of the
group’s members, and he denounces the
long-standing rule of their community,
“You kill: you die,” saying that it no
longer applies to them. As the dead gnaw
on the metal fence behind Rick, snarling
and snapping, their rotting flesh peeling
off their face as it scrapes along the
chain-link, Rick shatters the hope that
remains in the group. The hope that they
will be rescued, the hope that this will
end. He instills in the group a new
understanding of their station in the
world, declaring once-for-all what
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Canavan calls “the ecology of universal death” (Canavan 441).

The zombie’s invasion from the past declares and defines our only possible future: death.
C.S. Lewis, in Learning in War-Time, speaks about the “perpetual human condition” and
acknowledges that war does not bring death closer or make it any more grotesque or painful:
“human life has always been lived on the edge of a precipice” (Lewis 48). Similarly, the zombie
does not create a new condition: it is just a disgusting, walking reminder of what faces us all.
Canavan puts it this way, “The zombie’s remorseless, infective hunger is a barely sublimated
figuration of the entropic lurch of time and the inevitable degeneration of our own bodies
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towards death, a horror which technological and social progress may delay but cannot hope to
avert” (Canavan 441).
The difference between humanity and monster in these stories is not that one is violent
and the other is passive, nor is it that one is savage and the other is human (as Rick Grimes
points out in the speech above). Rather, “what separates ‘us’ from ‘them’ in zombie narrative is
always only the type of violence used” (Canavan 442). This language sets up a comparison
between the human and the zombie, where the zombie seems to be the opposite end of the
spectrum. However, the zombie is not picky in its adversaries. It is not hateful solely towards
Rick’s band of survivors. It does not side with one group of the living and pit itself against
another. The zombie hates all living equally, carnally. The adversary in The Walking Dead is
always human and becomes the adversary by abandoning its humanity, incorporating some
aspect of the Monster into itself. In so doing, the human adversary places itself at the opposite
end of the spectrum from Rick and leaves the zombie in the middle: the perfect benchmark, the
moral neutral against which we judge the entire cast.
Bishop sees this trend across the zombie apocalypse genre. There always comes a point
when the survivors can rather adequately protect themselves against the dangers of the zombie.
Bishop says that once this happens, “the zombies cease to be much of a direct threat. Instead, the
real fear comes from the other human survivors, those who can still think, plot, and act” (Bishop
24).
Early in the story, the survivors were plagued by—well—the plague. Then, as they found
security within the walls of the prison, they ran into the Governor who chopped off Rick’s arm,
imprisoned and sexually assaulted Michonne, and eventually destroyed their prison sanctuary,
catapulting the crew back into the dangers of the apocalyptic world. This cycle continues as they
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soon encounter Gareth, the leader of another group of survivors at Terminus who have turned to
cannibalism. Rick’s group escapes, but they find themselves back out on the road. There is
another concentration of survivors holed up in Grady Memorial Hospital in Atlanta, but a few
power-hungry police officers run this community with brute force. Finally, Rick and Company
find themselves brought into a community that is truly safe. This torturous cycle seems to have
finally come to an end within the walls of Alexandria. It is surrounded by 10-foot high walls of
cold-rolled steel; they have a remnant of a governmental body, clean water, food, warm beds,
houses, neighbors, kids. As Rick settles in, he hears of other similarly safe communities. He
starts to allow himself to dream, to forget who he has become, forget the words he once told his
group: “We are the walking dead.”
The fires of chaos burn furiously just beyond the gates of Alexandria. The cycle
continues unabated, and just as far as the pendulum swings towards order, so it returns to chaos.
A man whistles just outside the gates. The arhythmic “tap, clunk, tink, tap” of something wooden
being dragged across the wrought-iron bars punctuates the Alexandrians’ blissful ignorance of
the world. The Wielder of Chaos has returned with a barbed-wire wrapped baseball bat
affectionately named “Lucille” and the most confusing moral compass anyone has ever seen. His
name is Negan, and he is here to save you. Don’t try to resist.
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ii.

Negan’s Message

“Negan is kind. Negan is respectful. Negan is psychotic. Negan is ruthless.”
-Robert Kirkman

Many different scholars have postulated various analytical statements which these
zombie apocalypse stories seem to be making about the culture at-large, yet all of the voices
blend together into three general categories: rotting ideals, moral decay, and insatiable hunger.
These cultural critiques are embodied in the zombie’s rotting flesh, in its station as death
returned, in its predatorial hunting of the living. By analyzing the features of the zombie’s
different functions in literature, we can infer the statements it makes about culture, “Like a letter
on a page, the monster signifies something other than itself” (J. Cohen 4).
The world of The Walking Dead is built for Negan: it’s a twisted, post-apocalyptic
playground complete with crumbling societal infrastructure, malleable morality, and a populace
caught in an ever-present state of fear. He steps into this world like Andy Dufresne at the end of
Shawshank Redemption. Negan is an incredibly vivid and disturbing answer to Robert Kirkman’s
exploration, “In a world ruled by the dead, we are forced to finally start living” (Kirkman).
Negan is a wildly complicated character, yet he is marked by three overarching qualities.
If it was not already obvious before meeting Negan, his introduction makes it incredibly
obvious that The Walking Dead is not a story for the faint of heart. He is remarkably vulgar and
grossly inventive with his choice of words. A quick scan of his first appearance in the comics
shows that nearly 10% of his words are swears (Kirkman). Just take a look at this page. I have
censored the sensitive words for your viewing pleasure:
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This is a person we would almost certainly never encounter in real life. His vulgarity has
been blown up to a comical proportion. However, it is not just his word choices which shock us,
but also the way in which he chooses to explore different topics. For example, let’s take a look at
the first scene in which we truly get to meet Negan. He has surrounded Rick and his entourage
(Maggie and Glenn are there as well as Rick’s son, Carl, and a few others), bound their hands,
and lined them up on their knees in front of him. Negan takes this opportunity to explain to Rick
the “New World Order” and cover in detail what is about to happen. The panels above show his
reasoning where he eventually lands on executing one individual by way of baseball bat.
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Negan processes his decision out loud, talking through the various moral reasons why he
can’t murder each person. Pointing at Glenn, an Asian man, he says, “Not you... I’m a lot of
things but I’d never want to be called a racist,” then turns to Heath, a black man, and says,
“Same. Race card” (Kirkman). This comes right after he chooses not to kill Carl because his
story is “too [expletive] interesting” (Kirkman). Negan’s moral compass seems random and
unhinged. Fittingly, he turns to a child’s game to decide:

Negan is chaotic, his justice is decentralized and random, he is disgusting and repulsive.
The question is Why? Why Negan? He is nuanced and confusing. He does horrible things, but he
has a sense of honor. He holds a strict set of laws and sticks to his word. He also bashes in
people’s skulls with a baseball bat and a smile and has a room where he keeps his many wives.
Kirkman sheds a little light on Negan, saying, “This is a guy who, much like Rick [the hero], has
survived through horrendous things” and successfully leads and protects a sizable group of
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people in the middle of a zombie apocalypse. Negan is a leader “who’s had his morality dial a
few clicks away from Rick toward the darker aspects of his personality” (Kirkman).
Negan is an exaggeration of the worst things Rick could have become. One could even
make the argument that Negan is to Rick what Rick has been to other communities of survivors.
Within the context of the story, Negan serves as Rick’s antithesis, revealing in Rick the worst
things about himself. But, in the reader’s relationship with Negan, he also reveals the vulgar
things about the audience. By giving himself up so wholly to vulgarity, he makes us question
whether any amount is tolerable.
Negan’s vulgarity is a product of the sociopathic, protagonist syndrome which seems to
plague all Machiavellian characters, both in literature and in real life. Negan has a sense of
entitlement that spawns from an overgrown ego. He has given himself permission to do as he
pleases because he is above everyone else. Because he knows what is wrong with the world and
he is the only one capable of fixing it. In the climax of All Out War: Part Two, as Rick and
Negan share their two different perspectives on the world, Negan says:

That final line, “I’m saving lives,” is the burden of proof. However messed up he is,
however twisted and backwards and broken his moral compass is, Negan does not lie. He truly
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believes that his actions are leading to the betterment of society, to the improvement of the
quality of life for people in the long run. This is at the heart of Machiavellian theory; not
necessarily that Machiavelli prescribes an overinflated ego—he doesn’t—but in the fact that it
requires an overinflated ego to practice Machiavellian politics. At the very core of Machiavelli’s
teaching is the message, “You are the only one who can save them. Everyone else will screw it
up: you won’t. So you must be in control of everyone and everything.” And so, the good
intentions of preserving the republic become poisoned in the process.
Negan has named his group “the Saviors” and they live in an warehouse called “the
Sanctuary.” The message he spreads is that he is protecting those who cannot protect themselves.
He is saving those who would otherwise perish. He is fighting back against the apocalypse and
the only way to do this is through brute force. The only way people will listen and obey is
through fear. In the eight season of the television adaptation of the comics, Negan is sitting in a
post-apocalyptic board room with Gregory, the leader of the Hilltop community. Gregory looks
across the table and says, “Negan, I don’t like killing people any more than you do.” Negan’s
response not only shows his gluttonous tendencies we discussed above, but it also details the
reasoning behind his methods. Why he operates the way he does. Negan cuts Gregory off:
I like killing people... I say it’s about killing the right people. See, you kill the
right people at the right time, everything falls into place. Everybody’s happy.
Well, some people more than others. But you kill one and you could be saving
hundreds more, and that is what we are all about: We save people (“The Big
Scary U”).
This is literary Machiavellianism in its purist form. The ends justify the means.
Machiavelli writes, “with a few [cruel] examples, [the prince] will be more merciful than those
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who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to arise, from which arise murders and robberies”
(Machiavelli 116). By making an example of one, the prince instills enough fear in the
community that he deters other potentially violent and harmful actions. Negan brutally executes
one person from each community he “saves” at the outset, and—until Rick—each community
falls in line, paralyzed by fear. He justified his actions by saying that he was “distracting them
from how miserable their lives are” or by telling himself and his people that they are “protecting
the weak and vulnerable.”
Negan’s ego alongside the societal collapse of the apocalypse gives him permission to
push aside all standard moral conventions and write and rewrite his own as is needed in any
given circumstance (incredibly similar to what Rick has done throughout the entire series to this
point). However, for some reason, Negan’s doing so rubs us the wrong way. I think our distaste
can be boiled down to two main reasons: the extent to which Negan pushes morality and the
reasons why he does so. Let’s look at two scenarios in which Rick and Negan operate incredibly
similarly and dissect both the vulgarity and intent of the action.
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Early in the comics (actually, just
prior to Rick’s “We are the walking dead”
speech mentioned earlier), Rick murders a
man named Dexter. Leading up to this
event, Rick had installed a simple
ultimatum with the members of his group,
“You kill: you die.” A straightforward,
understandable 1:1 ratio. Yet, as has been
established across the zombie apocalypse
genre, the humans are the dangerous ones.
When Rick and company found their way
into the prison, there was a small group of
inmates who had been holed up there since
the beginning of the pandemic. The leader
of these survivors is a man named Dexter.
At first, the two groups coexist somewhat
peacefully, but this doesn’t last long at all, as Dexter tries to seize an opportunity to kick Rick
and his friends out of their newfound safe-haven. In the middle of the coup, a horde of zombies
crash through the gates and attack the group. In the chaos of the fray, Rick turns on Dexter,
raises his pistol, and fires.
The first of Negan’s many bloody altercations with Rick and company results in him
executing Glenn by way of baseball bat. This is the nursery rhyme selection discussed earlier.
Negan, in his fashion, sums up the preceding events rather succinctly: “I’m Negan, and I do not
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appreciate you killing my men. Also, when I sent my men to kill your men for killing my men,
you killed more of my men. Not cool” (Kirkman). For these events, someone must pay the price,
which leads us to this point here:

Rick definitely faces pushback from his community for the murder of Dexter. He and
Tyreese (one of the stronger and more influential members of the group) get into a fistfight
which brings both individuals inches from death. Rick is even replaced as the sole leader of the
group in favor of a committee as the other members believe he has begun to lose his sanity.
However, Rick remains respected by both his community of survivors and the reading audience
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because each party is by and large convinced of two things: Dexter was dangerous and Rick did
only what needed to be done.
The same cannot be said for Negan, not just in this case with Glenn, but also with nearly
any moment in the entire comic book series. Negan breaks Machiavellian code by exhibiting
justice unjustly, which Machiavelli says inevitably breeds hatred. Negan’s reasoning for
executing one of the members of Rick’s cohort—if we’re being honest—does make sense in
some twisted fashion of justice. However, we know that Glenn is not dangerous. Glenn has only
ever protected and loved those around him. He and Maggie are expecting their baby to be
delivered soon. Glenn is a good man.
Second, this does not seem to be something that Negan feels he must do. At least,
necessity doesn’t seem to be the only motivating factor for Negan. Throughout every aspect of
Negan’s life, there runs this undercurrent of gluttony and indulgence. I’d like to recall a
statement Canavan has made: “what separates ‘us’ from ‘them’ in zombie narrative is always
only the type of violence used” (Canavan 442). Although Rick does have some incredibly brutal
and savage moments, for the most part, he keeps his hands clean, does only what is necessary,
and, in so doing, retains his humanity. Negan, on the other hand, is brutal. He is messy, violent,
and sadistic. Nothing sums up Negan better than his weapon of choice: Lucille.

Huseman 39
Negan is rarely, if ever, depicted in the comics without Lucille, and oftentimes, he is seen
caressing the bat as shown above. We find out later that Lucille is actually the name of his late
wife, who passed from cancer early in the pandemic. He had spent much of their marriage
sleeping with other women and lying to her. When she died, like everyone else in this
apocalyptic world, she turned and Negan couldn’t find it within himself to put her down. Now,
he carries her with him wherever he goes in the form of a twisted, gnarled baseball bat.
Lucille embodies Negan, so much so that he is not the same character without her in
hand. This image of a barbed-wire wrapped baseball bat is chaotic and violent. It represents the
apocalyptic world where the recreational is replaced with the practical. What once might have
been used by a child at a local park is now repurposed as a weapon. Not only does Lucille
represent the twisted, broken state of things, but she is also a physical manifestation of chaos.
The bat is a hodgepodge creation of things, a marriage of two disparate ideals, disordered and
mangled in appearance. Lucille is also an agent of chaos. Lucille is the tool which Negan uses to
tear down the current order of things and instill chaos. In this way, when Negan grabs hold of
Lucille, he truly becomes the Wielder of Chaos. The Machiavel. With Lucille as his instrument,
he instills fear in the people so that he can control them and, as he says, “save” them.
We hate Negan for this. We hate him because he reminds us of our own desire for power,
our own gluttonous indulgence. We hate Negan because we see his ugly ego and it reflects back
on us like a black light exposing the all-too-visible stains of sin on our heart.
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Conclusion: The Cycle of Chaos, Revisited

“I am inevitable.”
-Thanos

All things tend towards chaos. Society crumbles, buildings fall, morality deteriorates.
From dust to dust, our lives are a constant battle against entropy. The universe is like a castle in
the sand: many come along and use their strengths to build something strong, something that
might last, but all things crumble and turn to dust in the end. There is nothing that can withstand
the cycle of chaos.
There are those who are victorious for a time. Great men and women who are
remembered in the annals of history. Remarkable characters whose heroics are recorded in
legend and repeated in story. Yet, as all things do, these great individuals fall and chaos grows in
their place. In the onslaught of chaos thrives the one who can wield it. The man or woman who
can lay step into the tides of chaos, feel the momentum, the power it holds and direct it towards
their own gain.
Othello is “excruciating to watch” (Greenblatt 1285) because it unmasks the monster in
the mirror. Iago reveals the terrible inside each of us. It is not the death of Desdemona or Othello
which weighs on our psyche as we exit the theatre, but rather the inevitable, undeniable reality of
Iago. The unassailable realization of human capacity for evil. It is painful not only because we
recognize the possibility for this capacity in others, but even more so because we are made
certain of this capacity in ourselves. In inviting the audience to indulge in his fantasy, in drawing
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the audience “into a kind of complicity in his designs” (qtd. in Bloom 16), Iago flashes a mirror
on the state of our soul, incinerating the innocent veneer, exposing the tainted wreck beneath.
We are the monsters we create. The demons that lurk in the shadows of the open closet
door, the poltergeists that haunt the darkness beneath the flickering streetlamp, the horrors that
stalk about in the greyness beyond our limited scope of understanding, the monsters that plague
the pages of story all speak directly into who we are. They paint a picture of the wounds which
define us. These monsters are fear embodied, pain embodied, identity embodied. They follow us
wherever we go like a sinister shadow, a mirror image of ourselves, the photonegative of who we
hope to be, an ever-present reminder that each of us is a twisted, broken mess.
The hope of these stories—yes, there is hope—is that the Machiavel does not win. Chaos
does indeed reign for a time, but it never holds the throne for long. There was a time before the
Machiavel’s shadow darkened the room and there will be a time after when its image is wiped
from memory. The cultural anxieties which birthed the monstrous Iago were never realized.
Following Queen Elizabeth I’s death, King James I assumed the throne peacefully and reigned
for twenty-two years. He bore two sons and the throne passed unchallenged to his second son,
Charles I, upon his death.
We have yet to see the conclusion to this modern saga. Negan surely seems to speak as
profoundly to today’s audience as he did when he first entered this world nearly a decade ago.
However, we know that no king rules forever and all empires come to an end. The good, the bad,
the heroic, the atrocious. In our story, Negan is defeated. Not just the person and his army, but
his ideology as well. In the end, we know that there is light at the end of the tunnel.
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